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Abstract 
 
 
Research has shown that there is a sizable difference between new and old 
democracies in terms of the effect of ‘winning’ on system support. This study traces the 
development of the winner and loser gap, in relation to system support, exclusively for 
young democracies. Based on findings from previous research and theory I develop and 
test one hypothesis regarding these dynamics. My analysis focuses on 21 countries that 
have became democracies in the third wave of democratization or later. Findings from 
multilevel models indicate that, in accordance with my main hypothesis, the winner/loser 
gap tends to decrease in new democracies overtime. 
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1. Introduction  
In “the last decade, democracy has become virtually the only political model with global 
appeal, no matter what culture” (Inglehart/ Norris 2003: 70). This makes acquiring a 
deeper understanding of the inner workings of democracy an important research 
endeavor. One of the key pillars of liberal democracy are free and fair elections. 
However, ‘as democratic elections are designed to generate unequal outcomes’ it is 
important to trace citizens’ attitudes towards democracy based on the outcomes of these 
elections. Significant gaps in system evaluation between electoral winners and electoral 
losers carry important implications for a country’s democratic development.  
 
Past studies have shown that this gap does exist (see Anderson et al. 2005). As a 
general rule those that, on election day, find themselves in the political majority (winner) 
tend to be more satisfied with democracy that those who are not represented in the 
government coalition (losers) (Blais/ Gellineau 2007). One of the key findings in this 
literature is that this ‘gap’ in satisfaction (or system support1) is moderated by political 
institutions. For example, losers in majoritarian systems are less satisfied with 
democracy than losers in proportional “systems” (Anderson/ Guillory 1997). This past 
work has focused mainly on established democracies and gave little attention to new 
democracies. Anderson et al. (2005) shifted the focus to some extent when they 
compared the winner and loser gap in old and new democracies. Anderson's seminal 
book on the topic, showed that in younger democracies the winner-loser gap tends to be 
more pronounced than in older democracies. However, the book and multiple papers, 
reviewing and addressing similar questions have not yet touched the issue of how the 
winner and loser gap develops across time in new democracies The goal of this paper is 
to address this question, as it is especially important to trace attitudes towards the 
system in younger (and possibly more fragile) democracies. The issue here is if the 
winner and loser gap, which has proven to be wider in young than in old democracies, 
remains as wide, increases or decreases over time. A decrease of the gap would 
                                                   
1 In the remainder I use the terms ‘satisfaction’ ‘system support’ or ‘trust towards the system’ 
interchangeably. While I appreciate conceptual differences between these terms, for the purposes of this 
dissertation, I use them to indicate the degree of favorable attitudes/evaluations of the democratic system 
as a whole. 
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suggest that overall public opinion becomes more ‘at ease’ and trusting towards the 
political system indicating an increase in democratic support overall. If the opposite 
where to be the case, alarm bells would ring regarding the future of democratic 
institutions and governance in young democracies. As recent history has shown, 
countries which have newly become democracies often struggle to establish the 
institutions and bring about the governance outcomes that would make ‘democracy 
work’. This is likely to be reflected in heterogeneous levels of system support.  
 
This dissertation does not only contribute to the rich literature on winner and losers but 
also on the general academic debate on the determinants of system support and its 
development over time. The exclusive focus on third wave democracies and the time 
component that is integral to my analysis, largely missing from the literature thus far, will 
make a good contribution to the literature on the dynamics of system support in old and 
new democracies. I develop one main hypothesis in this paper which is later tested 
using World Value Survey data in a set of 21 Third Wave (and later) democracies. 
Findings from multilevel models indicate that, in accordance with my main hypothesis, 
the winner/loser gap tends to decrease in new democracies overtime. 
 
The paper is divided up in the following parts: the literature review will give an overview 
of the relevant literature and create a base for the theoretical contribution. In the 
theoretical part will I use a learning/ socialisation argument to develop expectations 
regarding system support between winners and losers in new democracies. This is 
followed by the methodical discussion of the variables, which leads into the results 
section. In the concluding discussion I reflect on the results and the overall research 
project.  
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2. Literature review  
Most studies on democratic system support or legitimacy are driven by the classical 
work of David Easton (1965). Political systems are viewed as open system, which is 
exposed to influences which are driven by other systems. For a system to survive it has 
to have the capability to respond to those influences (positive or negative) and the 
system has to simultaneously “adapt to the conditions under which they find themselves” 
(Easton 1965: 18). Hence citizens expect that their government responds appropriately 
in most circumstances, with taking into consideration if the input is from negative or 
positive nature. Political support (by citizens) or the absence of it can emerge in the 
forms of attitudes or behaviours, and will affect the political system. According to Easton 
two levels of citizen support emerge out of this basic design, the first is specific support, 
which focuses on the appointed and elected officeholders, who have to install and 
implement political decisions within the state. Diffuse support is expressing more 
symbolic emotions towards the states and its agencies (Norris 2011). Specific support 
should be affected by governmental performance, that is ‘the perceived decisions, 
policies, actions, utterances or the general style of … authorities’ (Easton 1975: 437). 
Diffuse support, “representing as it does attachment to political objects for their own 
sake, will not easily dislodged because of current dissatisfaction with what the 
government does” (Easton 1975: 445). Yet the political system relies on a balance of 
both types of citizen support. To have a balanced political system over a longer period of 
time, the system counts on a reserve of diffuse supporters. They keep the support stable 
in periods where the government performance is insufficient, even if it is only for a short-
period of time. If a change in diffuse support occurs, it should take place slowly as its 
origin is found in socialisation and social learning (Easton 1957, 1965, 1975). However, 
a lack of specific support over a longer period of time can provoke as well a general 
notion of dissatisfaction with the political system. Other scholars have argued along 
similar lines; they see specific support as a necessity to keep a government in power, 
while diffuse support is required to uphold the political system in the country as the 
primary form of government (Dalton 2002). Yet Easton’s differentiation between diffuse 
and specific support has mainly been successful on a conceptual level, however not on 
an empirical level. The issue lays within the surveys, as they fail to measure diffuse and 
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specific support the Eastonian way, as they measure some form of support. Further 
empirical issues originate through the empirical assessment of the relationship between 
citizens and state (Küchler 1991).  
 
Since this concept first appeared, a wide variety of factors have been identified that 
could influence how people perceive their political system, or what affects system 
support in general. This body of research on system support can be divided into two 
main strands. First, research taking ‘a macro-perspective emphasizing formal system 
properties, and a micro-view emphasizing citizens’ attitudes and actions’ (Weatherford 
1992: 149). The macro-perspective focuses on the proper allocation of democratic 
institutions which lead to accountability, responsiveness, and representation. These 
pillars are strongly associated with system support (Anderson et. al, 2005; see also 
Lipset 1960; Pitkin 1967; Huntington 1968; Dahl 1971; Lijphart 1984). Other studies 
have concluded that constitutional arrangements significantly related attitudes as well 
(e.g Lijphart 1999). For example, citizens tend to be more satisfied in consensual 
systems than in majoritarian systems (Lijphart 1999; Anderson and Guillory 1997). 
Further, findings suggest that polarization across the party system affects satisfaction 
with democracy (Ezrow/ Xezonakis, 2011). Also the economic situation in a country can 
influence the overall support and trust towards the political system (Norris 1999c, Clark 
et al. 1993, Gilley 2006). Hence if a country's financial situation is rather poor and will 
continue to be so in the near future, citizen will be less satisfied with the system until the 
financial situation turns (Rosenstone 1982).    
 
 Second, micro-studies concentrate on the individual-level and are concerned with the 
underlying attitudes towards democratic political systems as well as the citizens’ 
participation in the political process (Anderson et. al, 2005, Lipset 1960; Almond/ Verba 
1963; Barnes et al. 1979; Jennings et al. 1990). Long held beliefs and values (political 
culture an al Almond/ Verba, 1963) which are transmitted through socialization are 
important components of system support (Norris 1999a; see also Ingelhart 1990). This 
body of research has established that that citizens, who are more engaged within the 
political system (both on a psychological or in participatory faction) or those who have 
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greater trust in the maintenance of the system tend also to demonstrate higher levels of 
support (Finkel 1985; Anderson/ Guillory 1997). As citizens are not fond of political 
change (Whitefield/ Evans 1994) governmental stability could also increase satisfaction 
with democracy when the government responds in their view appropriately. The 
democratic political system can also be affected through citizens’ desire to predict 
political process, thus if citizens can to some extent foresee the process, hence voters 
can predict if their party will win or lose, an increase in satisfaction should emerge 
(Evans/ Whitefield 1993; Whitefield/ Evans 1994; Anderson/ O'Connor 2000). 
 
 
The winner loser debate 
 
The regular holding of elections, is one of the crucial institutional features which 
distinctively marks a democracy as a political system. Therefore, it should not be 
surprising that the literature on legitimacy and political involvement suggests that 
elections have the capability to enhance legitimacy, through voters’ participation in the 
electoral process (Anderson et al. 2005). The electoral process is to some extent an 
effect of system support as voting is not only a way for citizens to influence 
governmental processes but it is as well a way for the government to strengthen citizens’ 
involvement in the system. Citizen engagement is viewed by participatory political 
theorists as a key element in increasing people's awareness and to nurture a democratic 
citizen (Pateman 1970; Thompson 1970). Ginsberg (1982) counters by arguing that 
elections have the capacity to tie citizens to the political system and strengthen 
government control. Leaving the discussion on the normative interpretation on the 
effects of elections on citizens to the side, a number of empirical studies have shown 
that people's attitudes towards their government have become more positive after 
having participated in elections (Clarke/ Acock 1989; Clarke/ Kornberg 1992).  
 
Elections, however have outcomes and carry specific implications for distinct groups. 
Research on system support suggests that differences in satisfaction/ support levels 
relate to an individual’s status as a political ‘winner’ or ‘loser’ (Anderson and Guillory 
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1997). As a general rule those that, on election day, find themselves in the political 
majority (winner) tend to be more satisfied with democracy that those who are not 
represented in the government coalition (losers) (Blais/ Gellineau 2007). One of the key 
findings in this literature is that this ‘gap’ in satisfaction (or system support2) is 
moderated by political institutions. For example, losers in majoritarian systems are less 
satisfied with democracy than losers in proportional “systems” (Anderson/ Guillory 
1997). Anderson and Guillory (1997) argued that “the nature of a country's institutions 
and status as part of the political majority or minority interact in their effect on 
satisfaction with democracy” (1997: 68). Electoral minorities in a consensual system are 
better protected as the system provides the minority with a voice in the decision making 
process, compared to a majoritarian system where winners tend to gain the absolute say 
and are in a position to impose their will on those in the minority. Hence the winner loser 
gap in consensual systems is smaller (see also Lijphart 1998). 
 
The classic work by Anderson and Guillory has been appraised and further refined by a 
number of researchers.  We know, that the degree of satisfaction for the electorate 
during elections is affected by the expectation of victory or defeat (Blais/ Gélineau 2007; 
Sargent 2002). Research has also shown that electoral losers are in general more 
dissatisfied with the performance of the government and more interested in a political 
change (Bowler/ Donovan 2000; Bowler et al. 2002). Overestimation of the electoral 
prospects of one's own party during the campaign can create ‘surprised’ losers which 
have an even more negative view of the democratic system (Hollander, 2014; Blais/ 
Gélineau 2007). A negative stand also emerges if the so-called ‘loser’ is too long in the 
minority; it either leads to disillusionment with the political regime or citizen dropout 
(Anderson et al. 2005). Especially in systems where the winning and losing concept is 
relatively new, losers have to learn how to lose (Anderson/ Mendes 2006), if that does 
not occur the loser will continue to be more negative with regard to the democratic 
                                                   
2 In the remainder i use the terms ‘satisfaction’ ‘system support’ or ‘trust towards the system’ 
interchangeably. While I appreciate conceptual differences between these terms, for the purposes of this 
dissertation, I use them to indicate the degree of favourable attitudes/evaluations of the democratic 
system as a whole. 
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institutions. As the loser tends to be more critical towards the system, satisfaction with 
the overall system can be boosted by an electoral win (Singh et al. 2011).  
 
Furthermore, party identification also seems to be a sustainable component of the 
winning and losing concept among others. Singh et al. (2012) suggest that the enduring 
psychological attachments to political parties can have a positive effect on the 
individual's satisfaction with the government if the preferred party wins. The 
psychological component has to be taken into consideration when discussing the gap; 
for example, when voters can predict a negative electoral outcome in advance, voters 
who predicted correctly (their party would lose) tend to express higher levels of 
satisfaction than those who were surprised by the loss (Brehm 1956, 1962; Stricker 
1964; Cigler/ Getter 1977; Joslyn 1998). Moreover, people try to maintain a certain 
consistency in their beliefs and attitudes (Festinger 1957, 1964; Abelson/ Rosenberg 
1958; McGuire 1968) yet they develop expectations towards the system over time. 
Given that this growth of expectations across time occurs, the citizens will start to 
believe in the predictability of the political process which therefore affects their trust 
towards the democratic system (Evens/ Whitefield 1993; Anderson/ O’Conner 2000).      
Ruiz-Rufino (2013) steps away from the electoral minority and majority discussions and 
puts forward the idea to solely focus on ethnic majorities within the research field. The 
downside of this process is that it is only applicable in multi ethnic contexts.    
        
Finally, the effect of winning or losing on system support seems to be moderated by an 
individual's’ experience with democracy. The argument here is that the effect will depend 
on a socialisation processes. For example, there has been some discussion on how the 
level of satisfaction can vary between young and old democracies and Anderson et. al 
(2005) has shown that the winner and loser gap actually differs across settings. As 
citizens of young democracies have not yet had the opportunity to ‘acclimatise’ to the 
winning and losing process their inexperience can lead to a more zero sum conception 
of politics and therefore to less trust towards the system. On the other hand, in older 
democracies citizens with mature party systems, strong output institutions and citizens 
long process of socialization in democratic politics this gap tends to be smaller. 
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These latter findings are what motivates this research project. Findings above suggest 
democratic experience is crucial in determining levels of system support. However, we 
know very little about how the latter develops overtime in new democracies. More 
specifically I am interested here in the tracking of the winner and loser gap in an effort to 
provide an appraisal and a democratic ‘health check’ that to my knowledge is missing 
from the literature thus far.  
 
 
 
3. Theory and Hypotheses - The development of attitudes towards the system in 
new democracies.  
The Anderson et al. (2005) study presented above suggests that in nascent 
democracies ‘losing’ (and ‘winning’) is interpreted in a different way than in old 
democracies. The question that arises, and forms the main question of this dissertation, 
is if and how this ‘interpretation’ changes overtime. Initially, support levels between the 
two groups might diverge due to a number factors. The sizable amount of new losers, for 
example, could now be drawn from a pool of voters who would have been winners in the 
old system (Anderson et al. 2005). Hence those former winners are now less satisfied 
with the system as their interests are no longer a priority, as it would have been in the 
former non democratic state. Anderson et al. (2005) displayed this in their empirical 
testing with the example of former soviet countries (105 -106).  
 
Another factor could be that especially the first elections in a young democracy are often 
contests between different ideologies with divergent political, social and economic 
visions (Anderson et al. 2005). Those first elections are also power struggles as parties 
strive for control as they are the ones setting up the system and make decisions on how 
the country should be run (Boix 1999). The governance outputs originated by various 
political camps can also influence the winner and loser gap (Anderson et al. 2005). In all 
these cases parties and voters might be engaged in more zero sum conception of 
politics which will be evident in their attitudes and behaviour. Consequently, voters of 
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young democracies who do not belong to the majority feel even more left out by the 
system.  
 
For levels of support between winner and losers to converge a learning or socialization 
process needs to take place. At least this is where the theoretical argument and 
empirical findings in the comparison between young and old democracies suggest 
(Anderson et al. 2005).  
 
The learning processes can occur on two different levels, the first is on a system level. 
On a cross national level differences can be produced by “variations in political cultures 
and histories, as well as the novelty of democratic institutions, that may attenuate or 
intensify experience of losing” (Anderson et al. 2005: 91) 
.  
The second takes place at an individual level. As individuals develop their expectations 
towards the political system across time, citizens' ability to predict the political process 
should consolidate and therefore the citizens’ attitude towards the system should 
change accordingly (Evans/ Whitefield 1993; Whitefield/ Evans 1994; Anderson/ 
O'Connor 2000). Citizens in a new democracy are forced to learn democratic 
procedures from the ground up, and they have to grasp democracy under conditions of 
uncertainty which can be very irritating for electoral losers. Yet it is expected that as time 
passes citizens become more comfortable with system change and therefore the losers 
become more accepting about their loss (Whitefield/ Evans 1994). Ideally, after the 
socialization process occurred, there would be no significant gap in terms of democratic 
satisfaction between electoral winners and losers.   
 
There are additional arguments that suggest that in the long run citizens will feel less 
threatened by electoral outcomes. Losers are likely to feel heard by the government, and 
experience the protection and inclusion that the democratic system affords to minorities. 
To have a constant increase of satisfaction among sophisticated citizens, the presence 
of functional and fair political institutions is, of course, of importance. Those institutions 
are also important during the socialization phase as they, along with the other factors 
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positively influence the learning curve. Greater stability is likely to occur as time passes: 
“Constitutions that are observed and last for a long time are those that reduce the stakes 
of political battles. Pretenders to office can expect to reach it; losers can expect to come 
back” (Przeworski 1991: 36).      
 
Citizens’ perception of the role and outcome of elections can vary as it depends on their 
position on the learning curve. Trust among the citizens will be higher the longer 
democracy has been a status quo because as they learned that there will be further 
elections. With the experience of recurring elections and the peaceful transfer of power, 
citizens in older democracies will eventually come to believe that any kind of “election 
outcome will not fundamentally reorient the relations of power or the outcomes produced 
by the system” (Anderson et al. 2005: 93).  Simply put - losing can be experienced 
without major backlash towards the system itself. 
  
Following the above discussion, the desirable (and to some extent expected from 
theory) path for a new democracy would be that the winner and loser gap narrows over 
time. Of course both sides will never be completely synchronized in terms of satisfaction 
yet it would be desirable that the attitudes of the occasional losers do not deviate 
dramatically from the occasional winners. This pattern can be observed in most of the 
more established democracies as citizens acquired the knowledge that even if they find 
themselves in the political minority that their interests will be represented to some extend 
and their rights respected.   
 
Therefore: 
 
H1 - As years of democratic experience increase, the effect of winning/losing on system 
support will decrease.  
 
 
Figure 1 below presents this hypothesis in a stylised fashion. 
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Figure 1. Winning/Losing and system support in New Democracies 
 
T1, T2, and T3 refer to years of democratic experience, hence to the length of time 
country has been a democracy. The lines represent the effect of winning at these three 
different time points. At very early age this effect appears steeper, but that line flattens 
the more experience with democracy is acquired. 
 
I recognise here that there are arguments (and to some extent empirical findings) that 
contest the above rationale. The initial dissatisfaction among citizens does not have to 
dribble away as would be expected. It could remain due to an overall cynicism towards 
the government, depending on what the new political system actually delivers or how 
successfully it aggregates diverging interests. If the country remains shaken by high 
levels of corruption and weak institutions of governance one would expect that the 
course of events will not resemble exactly what has been described before and it is likely 
that will affect winners and losers in a similar way. Still one would expect that in the 
adverse scenario the gap will either increase or remain constant. The test that I perform 
below will provide opportunities to test whether these alternatives are a more accurate 
description of the dynamics of system support in young democracies.  
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4. Methodical discussion 
Case selection 
Taking into consideration the discussion by Bogaards (2012) on using democracy 
indexes to define the level of democracy for one country, the paper uses a combined 
filter of Freedom House and the polity index for its case selection. The countries 
analyzed have to fulfill four requirements; have 3.5 or higher on the freedom house 
index, a 6 or higher on the polity index, belong to the third wave of democratization or 
later and have uninterrupted years of democracy in the period under investigation. As 
the latest update on the polity score was from 2013 and 2015 for the freedom house 
index, there were some cases where the country was below 6 according to the polity 
score but above a 3.5 on the freedom house index, in that case it was still considered. 
The freedom house index was weighted more heavily in this case as it had 
comparatively newer and more accurate data. Twenty-one countries from the WVS 
satisfied the conditions outlined above (see Appendix C for information on which 
countries are included in the sample). 
 
The Dependent Variable:  
 
System support has been operationalized by researchers through the use of various 
survey items. The most frequently used is ‘the satisfaction with democracy’ or SWD.  
While this item is heavily criticized in the literature, there are many instances of it being 
useful and accurate. Some papers use SWD to measure ‘regime performance’ (Dalton 
2004; Norris 1999a; 1999b). Linde and Ekman raise the point that to measure support 
for the principles of democracy, SWD is not the right indicator as “it is an item that taps 
the level of support for how the democratic regime works in practice” (2003: 405). 
Concerns are also expressed as the indicator correlates with certain measures of 
support like executive approval or partisan preferences (Canache et al. 2001; 
Klingemann 1999; Kornberg and Clarke 1994). Other proponents of SWD dismiss the 
possibility, for SWD as an indicator for system support, as it taps into the support for 
authorities (Fuchs et al. 1995; Lockerbie 1993; Toka 1995). However, others interpret 
SWD as an item that sums different indicators and therefore ‘provides a useful overall 
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summary measure of satisfaction with existing democratic political systems’ (Clark et al. 
1993 pp.1003). On the side of critics Norris argues that SWD as a measurement item 
should be avoided as it can mean different things to different respondents and Rose et 
al. challenge SWD as respondents might vary in the standards applied when judging 
satisfaction (1998). Further critics show that the empirical evidence which exist and links 
SWD with political institutions refer mainly to Western European democracies (for 
example, Finkel et al. 1989; Seligson 1993; Lopez-Pina et al.1994; Rohrschneider 1999) 
and leave the new democratic component untouched. Therefore, further investigation is 
warranted to ascertain if SWD is equally important to comprehend citizens’ satisfaction 
with political institutions in new democracies (Ruiz-Rufino 2013).  
Yet Anderson (2002) argues that even though strong correlations between several 
survey questions suggest conceptual overlapping, this does not mean that the different 
measures compute exactly the same theoretical phenomenon. Others argue along the 
same line; Ezrow/ Xezonakis (2014) show that SWD remains a useful ‘hybrid’ indicator 
that measures important aspects of system support. To sum up, ‘in the absence of a 
better item, the satisfaction with democracy measure is a reasonable (albeit imperfect) 
indicator that we can use to test our theories’ (Anderson 2002 pp. 10).  
Even though the concept and the usage of SWD is heavily discussed, no real adequate 
solution is proposed on how to capture SWD therefore this research paper will use it as 
a variable by taking into consideration some of the criticism and trying to optimize it as 
best as possible. The standard question on SWD in the WVS would be “Satisfaction with 
the way democracy develops”, however this question was only asked in two waves and 
therefore a compatible solution had to be found. Canache et al. discuss repeatedly that 
the standard SWD variable correlates with three different levels of support; “support for 
incumbent authorities, system support, and for democracy as a form of government” 
(Canache et al. 2001: 515). This correlation could be due to respondents’ 
misinterpretation or judgment of the standard SWD question. As Canache et al. perform 
a number of test to perceive if SWD touches those three levels of support they find that 
SWD tapes in all three levels of support. This means that in some aspect each of those 
levels measure some aspects of SWD. From a theoretical argumentation the system 
support option would be the closest, Canache et al. include confidence in parliament, 
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armed forces, civil service, police, judicial system and political system. Further 
Magalhâes (2014) discussed further options on how to measure satisfaction with 
democracy without using the standard question. The paper presented that a combined 
variables held best up in multiple test where the variable was compared to two other 
options. The combined variable incorporated “Having a strong leader who does not have 
to bother with parliament and elections?”, “Having experts, not governments, make 
decisions according to what they think is best for the country.”, and “Having the army 
rule.”.  
From an analytical point of view an even better way to measure system support, hence 
citizens’ support towards the government, would be to use relevant questions in the 
WVS survey to form indices that would capture the concept I am interested in. In this 
case I have opted for two indices that conform to established practice in the literature 
and have used by other researchers in the past. The first is based on Norris (1999a, 
1999b) and Canache et al (2001) arguments and combines citizens’ confidence in 
political parties, government and parliament. The second variable incorporates three 
more: confidence in the civil service, police force and armed forces (for a total of six). 
The variable along Norris argument ranges from 3 (being very dissatisfied with 
democracy) to 12 (being very satisfied with democracy). The variable which incorporates 
6 variances of confidence towards state institutions ranges from 6 (being very 
dissatisfied with democracy) to 24 (being very satisfied with democracy). From this point 
forward I will refer to this as SFD (Support for Democracy). SFD is, I believe, a better 
fitting term to describe the areas that the variables are measuring. Further information 
on the variables can be found in Appendix A and B.  
 
 
The Independent Variables 
For this study the independent variables are: electoral winner/ loser (the variable of 
interest) and interest in politics, economic performance evaluations, and demographic 
characteristics as control variables. Each variable is discussed below.  
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Electoral Winner or Loser 
From a theoretical standpoint winning or losing is about an individual's allegiance to the 
party in or out of power. As discussed in the framework political allegiance and electoral 
outcomes are connected, as the feeling of winning and losing is linked with an 
individual's electoral choice. To examine the general effects of winning or losing with 
regard to individual attitudes towards the government, the outcomes of elections have to 
be matched with the answers given by individuals on their political choice.  
 
The categorization of an individual as an electoral winner or loser can be achieved 
through the support of a survey question that asks the respondent which party the 
individual voted for at the last national elections. According to Anderson and colleagues 
(2005) if that question is not asked in the survey, a question asking the responded which 
party they would vote for if there would be an election can be used as a proxy. The 
responses given will then be linked to the information about which party or parties 
controlled the government at the time the survey was conducted. Therefore, the 
individual who responded was aligned with the party/ parties in government are 
categorized as being in the majority (winners). Those whose answers were the individual 
would have voted for another party is categorized as being in the minority (loser).   
 
Yet the question is open to measurement issues as voters are likely to falsify their 
statements. They are more likely to say that they voted for the winning party then stating 
which party they actually voted for. A further measurement obstacle is that the question 
can be formulated in two ways, the first is which party they voted for in the latest election 
and the second which party they intended to vote for in the upcoming election. Both 
questions have issues but best would be to combine the data. However, most surveys 
which include questions about voter’s choice and questions about beliefs in government 
include only one of the two possibilities on voter choice question. Due to the data 
availability, the winner/ losers indicator is based either on the past vote or the intentional 
vote (Anderson et al. 2005). The WVS questions the participants about which party they 
would vote for at the moment the survey was conducted, yet due to often long time 
intervals between the last election and the survey, preferences could have changed. 
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Based on the literature it is expected to see a clear gap between winners and losers in 
terms of their level of satisfaction towards democracy (Anderson/ Guillory, 1997; 
Anderson et al 2005).    
 
Interest in Politics 
Interest in politics is another frequently used indicator in models of system support. 
Interested citizens are likely to be more informed.  Within the WVS there are two 
possible proxies for this variable. One is measuring the general political interest while 
the other is how important politics is in the life of the participant. Both options have some 
theoretical shortcomings, but both could be used, therefore a simple frequency analysis 
was conducted to gain an overview on the distribution of the answers. The result 
showed that they are pretty much equally distributed, yet the variable - “Interest in 
Politics” showed to have a better distribution and is to some extent closer to the 
theoretical argument therefore this is the one I used. Former studies have shown that 
citizens, who are interested in politics, tend to show higher levels of satisfaction than 
those who are generally not interested in politics (Finkel 1985; Anderson and Guillory 
1997). Therefore, a positive relationship between ‘interest in politics’ and ‘satisfaction 
with democracy is to be expected.    
 
Perception of economic performance  
Citizens’ evaluation of the system output is key for every study which examines 
satisfaction with democracy. Performance evaluation influences the reputation of 
political institutions and the political system as a whole. Leaning on Anderson and 
Guillory (1997) paper, which argues that economic performance as a proxy for system 
output can affect citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. They further argue that those 
survey participants who evaluate the economic performance negatively are likely to be 
less satisfied with the democratic processes. It is expected that the overall effect of 
economic satisfaction on SFD would be positive. Anderson and Guillory measure 
economic performance on a sociotropic and egocentric level, however the WVS data 
only covers the socio tropical approach.  
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Demographic Variables 
Lastly, I will control for standard sociodemographic variables; Age, gender, education, 
employment status (Appendix A). It is to expect that with age citizens become more 
supportive towards democracy as they experienced democratic socialisation. It is 
anticipated that the educational variables show that citizens with low education are more 
supportive than those with higher levels of education. Similar findings are expected for 
employment, that those with employment are more supportive than those who are 
unemployed.    
 
The test of my hypothesis will be done through the use of an interaction term that is 
included in the model. This interaction term is comprised by a measure of a country’s 
experience with democracy and the status of winner and loser. In this case the age of 
democracy in years is the variable that is used to gauge experience with democracy. 
The sign of this interaction compared to the main effects of the winner loser variables 
(and to some degree but not wholly its significance) will give an indication as to whether 
H1 is supported, as explained in the results section.   
 
 
5. Results 
Does the winner and loser gap narrow with the years of democratic experience in new 
democracies? Figure 2 displays preliminary evidence on an aggregate level. Some 
countries support the hypothesis while in others the gap remains stable or even 
increases. To investigate how the winner and loser gap in relation to support for 
democracy develops over time, plotting the levels of system support for the two groups 
under investigation for one of the two dependent variables (the combined index of trust 
for political parties, the parliament and government). The graphs track the gap across 
time, hence they combine data from 1989 to 2014 (6 waves). For some countries there 
has been a WVS for each of the five waves, while for others a WVS questionnaire has 
been fielded only once or twice. Hence countries with one wave have been excluded as 
no timeline can be established. Also it is harder to explore the true behaviour of the gap 
with countries which only have been questioned twice, if compared to countries which 
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have been questioned more often. It is more challenging to predict the general 
behaviour of the gap, with countries that only participated in two waves, yet a general 
sense is still given.  
 
Figure 2. Winner-Loser Gap across time by country 
 
As it can be observed in the display above some countries behave exactly as suggested 
in the hypothesis (eg. Colombia, Uruguay and South Africa). However, there are cases 
where the gap first narrows and then widens again (eg. Argentina and Chile); it is difficult 
to speculate why this the case but internal political issues could be held responsible for 
this trend. In cases where only two waves have been included in the analysis very mixed 
results can be observed, in some cases the gap increases dramatically after being 
relatively small (Taiwan and Albania). The immense change could suggest highly 
polarising political issues during elections or democratic failure. However, there are 
cases where the gap closed or remained constant (Georgia, Indonesia and Brazil), 
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however in the cases of Indonesia and Brazil the gap is very narrow which would 
support hypothesis 0. 
Nevertheless, there is one case which behave rather strangely: in theory it is to be 
expected that losers are general less satisfied with democracy than winners, yet in the 
case of Mexico losers are at some points more satisfied than winners. During the time 
where the losers were more supportive of the government was in the course of the 
legislation of PAN, in the legislation periods before and after PRI was in the majority. 
During the PAN legislation there was still a high number of PRI supporters which to 
some extent explains the reversal of winners and losers’ satisfaction. An alternative 
explanation is that that PAN did not behave as voters hoped for and therefore were less 
satisfied with democracy.   
 
5.1 The effects of individual and country-level variables on satisfaction with democracy 
The analysis resulted in two tables; the first displays the data analysis with the SFD 
variable that was formed by the more parsimonious index used to in Figure 2 (three 
questions about confidence about political parties, parliament and government, or what 
one would call ‘input’ institutions). In the second table an identical analysis, mainly 
designed as a robustness check, has as a dependent variable the index formed of 
confidence in police, government, parliament, civil service and armed forces (‘input’ and 
‘output’ institutions together). Both variables have their limitations as noted earlier but 
they afford a more efficient test of my hypotheses.  
 
The following table presents results from the first dependent variable.  
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Table 1. Multilevel regression analysis of satisfaction with democracy (SWD_Norris)  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
    
Winner 0.826*** 0.802*** 1.279*** 
 (0.148) (0.143) (0.391) 
Age of democracy  -0.0291** -0.0182 
  (0.0126) (0.0139) 
Interest in Politics  0.444*** 0.439*** 
  (0.0264) (0.0238) 
Gender1  -0.0491* -0.0459 
  (0.0280) (0.0286) 
Not completed elementary education  0.440*** 0.415*** 
  (0.0881) (0.0754) 
Completed elementary education  0.249*** 0.235*** 
  (0.0594) (0.0548) 
Not completed university education  -0.0331 -0.0357 
  (0.0513) (0.0505) 
Completed university education  -0.205*** -0.201*** 
  (0.0524) (0.0495) 
Unemployed  0.0925 0.0816 
  (0.0622) (0.0565) 
Age  -0.000479 -0.000243 
  (0.00207) (0.00184) 
Satisfaction with financial situation  0.0343** 0.0368*** 
  (0.0142) (0.0122) 
Winner*Age of democracy   -0.0300 
   (0.0186) 
Constant 6.289*** 5.538*** 5.363*** 
 (0.108) (0.250) (0.245) 
    
Country Level Variance 0.764*** 0.698*** 0.703*** 
 (0.0586) (0.0604) (0.0597) 
    
Individ level Variance 2.085*** 2.039*** 2.036*** 
 (0.0353) (0.0339) (0.0331) 
AIC 246950.2 208858.6 208728.5 
BIC 246986.0 208981.8 208860.4 
Waves 5 5 5 
Countries 21 21 21 
Observations 57262 48932 48932 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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The results of the multilevel regression analysis confirm the existence of the gap. Even 
when controlled for factors that can influence people's attitudes towards the government 
in all three models winners’ express higher satisfaction/support than losers as suggested 
by the positively signed and significant coefficient for the winner variable. Model 1 shows 
a simple bivariate analysis with only the winner and loser variable. In Model 2 it can be 
observed that the coefficient remains significant and correctly signed after the control 
variables have been added. The models further show that survey participants who have 
completed university education are more dissatisfied with the political system than 
participants with basic education. This pattern can be observed frequently when 
education is used as a control factor in SFD analysis (for example Anderson et al. 2005: 
104). The analysis also finds that there is a positive effect on satisfaction with 
democracy if citizens are interested in politics. Other demographic variables have weak 
impacts in this Model, it can be noted that male participants are less satisfied with 
democracy and that participants who are satisfied with their financial situation are more 
satisfied with democracy. Model 3 incorporates the interaction effect between the winner 
and loser gap and the years of democratic experience. As is the case, and has been my 
expectation, the winner loser variable exerts a positive effect on the support for 
democracy variables in models 1 and 2. In model 3 the winner/loser variable effect 
should be interpreted as the effect of winning in nascent democracies. If H1 is to be 
supported I would expect that the interaction term would have minus sign suggesting a 
decreasing effect of winner on support as the age of democracy increases. If the 
alternative scenarios (underlined in the theory section) were to be supported I would 
expect a positive sign suggesting an increasing effect of winner as we move along the 
values of the age of democracy. The results show that the interaction term is correctly 
signed but is borderline statistically insignificant at the p=.101 level. In order to have a 
more accurate picture of the potential moderating effect we plot this effect in Figure 3. 
The graph suggests that the decreasing effect is present and statistically significant 
along the values of the age of democracy variable until about the 29th year at which 
point the confidence intervals cross zero suggesting the gap between winners and 
losers is not statistically significant in these cases. This evidence provide support for H1.  
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Figure 3. Estimates of winner-loser gap (SWD_Norris) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 displays a similar analysis with an alternative SFD variable as described 
previously. The SFD variable in this case also includes confidence in armed forces, 
police forces, and civil services. It is to be expected that the results differ to some extent 
from table 1, but the overall findings should remain constant.   
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Table 2. Multilevel regression analysis of satisfaction with democracy (SWD_Combined) 
    
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Winner 1.213*** 1.166*** 2.068*** 
 (0.215) (0.211) (0.536) 
Age of democracy  -0.0484* -0.0280 
  (0.0247) (0.0266) 
Interest in Politics  0.631*** 0.621*** 
  (0.0439) (0.0403) 
Gender  -0.0447 -0.0383 
  (0.0461) (0.0470) 
Not completed elementary education  0.721*** 0.673*** 
  (0.165) (0.144) 
Completed elementary education  0.471*** 0.445*** 
  (0.102) (0.0959) 
Not completed university education  -0.145 -0.149 
  (0.104) (0.103) 
Completed university education  -0.449*** -0.441*** 
  (0.0916) (0.0872) 
Unemployed  0.0948 0.0742 
  (0.101) (0.0916) 
Age  0.00358 0.00405 
  (0.00386) (0.00351) 
Satisfaction with financial situation  0.0850*** 0.0896*** 
  (0.0232) (0.0202) 
Winner*Age of democracy   -0.0565** 
   (0.0252) 
Constant 13.46*** 12.18*** 11.85*** 
 (0.197) (0.478) (0.475) 
    
Country Level Variance 1.420*** 1.349*** 1.354*** 
 (0.122) (0.138) (0.136) 
    
Individ. Level Variance 3.577*** 3.498*** 3.492*** 
 (0.0643) (0.0648) (0.0639) 
AIC 295849.9 250806.5 250657.6 
BIC 295885.5 250929.1 250788.9 
Waves 5 5 5 
Countries 21 21 21 
Observations 54861 46894 46894 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
26 
Model 1 shows the pure effect of winning, which is statistically highly significant. This 
effect does not change as additional control variables are added to the model (model 2). 
The analysis shows that those who are interested in politics are more satisfied with 
democracy than those who are not interested. The results also show that survey 
participants who had only an elementary education are more positive towards the 
system then those who had a university education. Further, participants who are 
satisfied with their financial situation are more positive towards the system then those 
who are not financially satisfied. Model 3 then includes the interaction effect of winners 
and losers with the years of democracy. The interaction effect in Model 3 is negative and 
statistically significant. 
 
Figure 4 will show an estimate on how the gap will behave over time. The graph 
suggests that a decreasing effect is present and statistically significant along the values 
of the age of democracy variable until about the 27th year. At 27th the confidence 
intervals cross zero suggesting the gap between winners and losers is not statistically 
significant in these cases. This evidence again provide support for H1.  
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Figure 4. Estimates of winner-loser gap (SWD_Combined) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Taken together table 1 and 2 provide a similar picture with H1 being supported. Yet the 
tables show different levels of significance and strength of the interaction, which can be 
expected as the two dependent variables are somewhat different.  A similar picture can 
be seen for the control variables with small differentiations in the two tables but no major 
disparities.    
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6. Conclusion   
 
The objective of this paper was to track the dynamics of system support in new 
democracies. Based on learning/socialization theoretical argument I developed one 
hypothesis regarding the difference in system support between winners and losers and 
the development of that gap through time. Results from multilevel regression models 
showed that the gap narrows as years of democratic experience increase, the findings 
remain constant even when alternative versions of the SFD variable were considered.  
 
Limitations of the study are for one the construction of the ‘experience of democracy’ 
variable and also of the SFD variable, further issues arose through the documentation of 
the WVS data. The ‘age of democracy’ is not a perfect indicator of experience as 
countries enter the models at various stages of democratic development and this 
experience is not tracked across countries in the same way. I have run the above 
models using the WVS wave as proxy (and controlling for age of democracy) for 
experience and results point to similar conclusions.  
The discussion on system support indicators is broad, and a lot of criticism has been 
raised towards variables as they ones used here. Yet the literature does not suggest any 
alternative that could have been appropriate to measure SFD besides using the 
available questions. For the conducted analysis the standard question (satisfaction with 
democracy) was not available therefore an appropriate solution had to be found. The 
option which was used is based on previous research and has proven to be theoretically 
and empirically robust. The empirical tests with both ‘support for democracy’ variables 
also add to the robustness of my results.  
 
In a position to reflect on the thesis, it would maybe have been more appropriate to 
rework my SFD variable. The variables as they are now measure for one the input side 
of politics while the other measures a combination of input and output. It can be 
discussed if it would have been more adequate to construct a variable that mainly is 
concerned with the output side of politics. However, I concluded for myself that a 
combined variable (input and output) might be a better fit for my study. The WVS 
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documentation was especially in the earlier waves not as clear as it was needed for the 
analysis when the survey was conducted. The issue with that is if the survey was 
conducted in the same year as the election, detailed information is needed for when 
exactly the survey took place, because it was key that the survey would be carried out 
after the elections occurred. Some of the information given about the exact time of the 
survey was incomprehensible, which lead to that some countries which would have fitted 
in the initial requirements were not in the survey.       
 
During the starting phase of this analysis great anticipation regarding whether the 
theoretical idea that was developed would be supported. If the findings would have been 
that the gap is not narrowing or even expanding across time, it would have been an 
interesting result to show. However, it would have been also worrying as it would have 
suggested that new democracies might never reach similar levels in terms of system 
support as more established democracies. Such results would imply that new 
democracies much longer stay in a state of transition, which then could create general 
questioning if democracy is the right system. In one respect, my results provide a more 
optimistic view about system support in new democracies.  
 
In the future, new research could focus tracking whether the type of transition, that took 
place in new democracies, influence the gap’s development across time. That is whether 
variations in system support are systematically related to a) the types of previous 
democracy regimes (e.g military dictatorship or other) and b) whether the transition was 
peaceful or violent. Such a studies would give further insight into the dynamics of system 
support in new democracies. Lastly the problem with the SWD variable should clearly be 
given some attention. Most scholars only use the WVS waves where the standard 
question for SWD was used, or limit themselves with datasets which focus more on a 
particular region, for example Western Europe.    
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7. Appendix  
Appendix A 
Data from wave 2-5 from the World value survey  
Satisfaction with Democracy. SWD_Norris: Computed variable of “Confidence: Political 
Parties”, “Confidence: Parliament”, “Confidence: The Government” the variable ranges 
from no confidence (3) to high confidence (12). 
SWD_Compined “Confidence: The Police”, “Confidence: Parliament”, “Confidence: The 
Government”, “Confidence: Political Parties”, “Confidence: Armed Forces”, “Confidence: 
The Civil Services” the variable ranges from no confidence (6) to high confidence (24). 
Winners. “If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would 
you vote? Just call out the number on this card. If don’t know: Which party appeals to 
you most?” If matches with the governing party (1), if it matches with the opposition (0).   
Personal Economic Performance. “How satisfied are you with the financial situation of 
your household?” Scale ranges from 1 to 10.  
Education. “What is the highest educational level that you have attained?” No formal 
education (1), Incomplete primary school (2), Complete primary school (3), Incomplete 
secondary school: technical/vocational type (4), Complete secondary school: 
technical/vocational type (5), Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type (6), 
Complete secondary: university-preparatory type (7), Some university-level education, 
without degree (8), University-level education, with degree (9). 
Age. Participants actual age. 
Gender. Male (1) or Female (2). 
Interest in Politics. “How interested would you say you are in politics?” Very interested 
(1), Somewhat interested (2), Not very interested (3), Not at all interested (4). 
Employment status. “Are you employed now or not? If yes, about how many hours a 
week? If more than one job: only for the main job” Full time employee (1), Part time 
employee (2), Self employed (3), Retired/pensioned (4), Housewife not otherwise 
employed (5), Student (6), Unemployed (7), Other (8). 
Experience with Democracy. The amount of years the country had experience with 
democratization at the point where the survey took place. 
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Appendix B 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Mini-
mum 
Maxi-
mum 
Satisfaction with Democracy 
(Combined) 
13.88 3.96 6 24 
Satisfaction with Democracy (Norris) 6.56 2.28 3 12 
Winner 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Interest in Politics 2.22 0.96 1 4 
Not completed elementary education 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Completed elementary education 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Not completed university education 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Completed university education 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Unemployment 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Gender 0.49 0.5 0 1 
Age 40.35 16 15 99 
Satisfaction with Financial situation 5.58 2.63 1 10 
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Appendix C 
Table 4. Included countries and waves 
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Appendix D 
Table 5. Parties which won the election before the survey   
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Table 5. Continues on next page 
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Appendix E  
Table 6. Age of democracy 
 
Table 6. Continues on the next page 
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